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PEOPLE OF THE BOOK: JUDAISM'S INFLUENCE ON
AMERICAN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
My Journey from Judaism to Jewish Law
Donna Litman*
My personal study of the Torah and the Talmud as an adult
has enhanced my legal scholarship and helped shape my current
thinking on legal theory. At the same time, my professional legal
training and experience as a law professor has shaped my
understanding of Judaism and provided a legal terminology and a
lens by which to view the array of Jewish laws. A confluence of
events helped shape my personal and professional journey.
The first series of events affected me personally. In 1999, I
joined a new program, Perek Yomi ("A Chapter a Day"), sponsored
by the United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism. The goal was
to read a chapter of the Hebrew Bible or Tanakh (the Five Books of
Moses, the Prophets, and the Writings) each day, to be completed
in two and a half years. Perek Yomi provided the schedule and
framework for personal study that I was seeking. In addition, I
helped form a small study group with three other professional
women to discuss the weekly reading and study questions. Perek
Yomi was followed by Mishnah Yomit with the United Synagogue
and then by commentaries and other texts selected by our study
group, including Maimonides' Book of Commandments (Sefer
Hamitzvoth). Sometimes when studying, I discovered the support
for something I had been taught to do without realizing it was
dictated by the Torah or Talmud, such as feeding my pets before
eating myself. Or I found the source for a famous quote, such as
Hillel's "If I am not for myself, who is for me, but if I am for my
own self [only], what am I, and if not now, when?"
The second series of events affected me professionally.
While I was engaged in personal study, I joined the Jewish Law
Section of the American Association of Law Schools (AALS) and
learned that a significant number of law schools offered courses in
Jewish Law. In 2002, I started teaching a comparative law
seminar on Jewish law, which I have taught annually since then.
This seminar is a survey course that explores civil and criminal
laws under Jewish law and the interrelationship between Jewish
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and American law. This seminar complements the other core
courses and skills workshops that I teach on tax and business and
estate planning. Since 2003, I have served as the Faculty Advisor
for the Jewish Law Students Association at NSU Law. In 2008, I
participated in a panel discussion on Teaching Jewish Law in
American Law Schools for the Jewish Law Section at the AALS
annual convention. These personal and professional events
influenced my teaching, thinking, and scholarship.
Prior to Perek Yomi and prior to teaching my Jewish Law
Seminar, my Jewish education occurred at home and at temple
and focused on the religious, moral, and ethical aspects of
Judaism. This included prayer and services, tradition and
holidays, commandments and tzedakah. It included the
importance of books and study, with special emphasis on how I
should conduct myself. As a young child, I learned the basic rules
of keeping a kosher home. My father was a Kohen, and I remember
how after receiving silver coins for the redemption of his close
friend's first born (pidyon haben), he returned them when the child
was thirteen. I studied Hebrew at my temple, became a Bat
Mitzvah, and continued religious and Hebrew classes through high
school. I did not, however, study the intricacies of texts, such as
the Torah or the Talmud. I also attended public school at a time
when certain clubs and neighborhoods were restricted and I was
part of a very small minority of students who were Jewish.
Although my religious and secular educations were separate, being
Jewish was an integral part of my identity. When I married, a
rabbi performed the ceremony for purposes of Jewish and
American law. When I adopted my son and later was divorced, a
rabbi and a judge were involved in separate religious and secular
proceedings.
My legal training placed religion in a realm that was
protected by, but separate from, American law. Prior to teaching
my Jewish Law Seminar, my understanding of Judaism fit nicely
within the context of the First Amendment of the Constitution.
Religion involved sincerely held beliefs, observances, and divine
commandments. When I began researching American law for
references to the Torah and Jewish law, I expected to find First
Amendment cases that addressed whether a law was
unconstitutional because it "established" a religion, or endorsed
one over another, or because it unduly burdened the free exercise
of religion. I was not prepared for the significant number of cases
and articles that quoted from the Bible or Jewish law for reasons
other than the First Amendment. For example, I was surprised to
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see the Supreme Court trace the roots of the privilege against self-
incrimination to ancient times, with a quote from Maimonides in
the Mishneh Torah, and trace the history of the presumption of
innocence back to Deuteronomy. Further, I was surprised to find
quotes from the Five Books of Moses-sometimes from the King
James Version-in Supreme Court opinions to support principles
of equal justice. In addition, I was surprised to find that some
prosecutors referenced the Bible to support capital punishment;
and then I learned how that support was misplaced. Through my
research, scholarship, and teaching, my perspective has changed
from viewing Judaism as a religion that can be separated from
American law to viewing it as a comprehensive legal system that
includes what we would classify as civil, criminal, ethical, moral,
and religious laws. Further, I have become aware of the extent to
which some of these laws overlap with American law-sometimes
operating in parallel with American law and sometimes deferring
to or overriding American law.
This change in perspective has been gradual. My adult
Jewish journey expanded my scholarship to include Jewish law
and a comparative analysis of aspects of the American and Jewish
legal systems, including analytic process, statutory construction,
and the interrelationship between the systems. This required me
to question which aspects of each system apply to the other,
including whether words with common translations have the same
meaning under both systems. For example, American law has
three distinct and separate branches of government-the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches. When I tried to apply
this tripartite system to Jewish law, I had problems defining and
separating the legislative and judicial branches. If I assumed the
legislative branch was divine, represented by the laws revealed to
Moses and written in the Five Books of Moses, this did not
translate completely because Jewish law also includes the rest of
the law that was given to Moses and that was to be passed down
orally from generation to generation. Further if I assumed the
judicial branch was represented by the sanhedrins and small
courts (batei din), and its judges (shoftim), this also did not
translate completely because the Great Sanhedrin also had
legislative authority-the authority to build a fence around the
Torah by enacting restrictions (gezerot). Thus, I appreciated the
importance of ascertaining the meaning of terms and questioning
whether English translations that use words that are terms of art
under American law, such as judges, have the same meaning
under Jewish law. Comparing Jewish law to American law also
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caused me to question basic concepts of American law and whether
they apply in Jewish law. For example, what defines common law
and what differentiates it from statutory law? What is the role of
the judiciary and do judges have legislative authority? Are the
laws written in the Five Books of Moses statutes? Are the laws
that were transmitted orally and preserved in the Talmud common
law or are they comparable to statutes? What about rabbinic laws?
Was the Great Sanhedrin comparable to a congress or a supreme
court of original jurisdiction, or both?
My studies and scholarship also centered on the processes
used in legal analysis. When researching American law, I often
employ both a global and lineal process to find and understand the
law. When applying the law to a set of facts, or outlining a plan
based on the law and facts, I often proceed in a more lineal
fashion. Researching and applying Jewish law seems to require an
even more global process because of the interdependence and
complementary nature of the written and oral laws. Laws on one
subject may be found in different portions of the Five Books of
Moses or in different portions of the Talmud, and may not
necessarily be found in the book (seder) or tractate (masechta) in
the Talmud whose title seems to cover that subject matter.
Further, the authority for laws on one subject matter in the
Talmud may come from a provision of the Torah that may not
appear to relate to that subject matter. I explored this process in
an article published in 2005 entitled "Jewish Law: Deciphering the
Code by Global Process and Analogy."1 For example, under Jewish
law, the written law commands the appointment of judges in the
Book of Deuteronomy, while the oral law states the composition
and authority of the sanhedrins and courts based on a number of
other provisions from the Five Books of Moses. A small sanhedrin
was composed of twenty-three judges, with a majority of one being
required to acquit but a super-majority of two being required to
convict. The authority for these numbers included verses from four
different chapters in two different books of the Bible, only one of
which directly related to the judicial process. This authority
related to a congregation (edah) judging whether a person had
committed murder or whether that person was a manslayer to be
delivered to a city of refuge. Another set of verses provided the
meaning of the term congregation by reference to the ten spies
who brought back an evil report on the land of Israel and another
1 Donna Litman, Jewish Law: Deciphering the Code by Global Process and
Analogy, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 563 (2005).
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was based on the commandment not to follow a multitude to do
evil. The Great Sanhedrin was composed of seventy-one, based on
a different verse in a different chapter. Today, the process by
which Jewish law is applied is even more complicated because
there is no Great Sanhedrin, and thus no supreme judicial or
supreme legislative body. By contrast, American law may proceed
in a much more lineal fashion based on the hierarchy of laws from
the Constitution to statutes to administrative or judicial authority.
For example under American law, the United States Constitution
vests power in one supreme court and in such inferior courts as
Congress determines, and Congress enacts laws regarding the
number of justices and district courts. Further, the Constitution
addresses the authority of the courts, and Congress has
supplemented this by legislation. Thus, the processes by which
laws were created and interpreted under Jewish and American
law have some significant differences.
My study of Jewish Law also lead me to compare statutory
construction under both systems. I was intrigued by the thirteen
rules (middot) compiled by Rabbi Ishmael that are found in many
daily prayer books. The more I studied these rules, the more I
compared them to American rules of statutory construction and
realized there were important similarities and differences. In
2012, I presented a paper comparing statutory construction under
Jewish and American law at the Jewish Law Association's (JLA's)
1 7 th International Conference on the Interaction of Jewish and
Other Legal Systems. This presentation was followed by the
publication of my paper by the Jewish Law Association in 2014,
entitled: "A Case on the Border between Jewish and American
Rules of Statutory Construction: A Comparative Analysis."2
In order to compare the thirteen rules with American rules
of statutory construction, I had to make certain assumptions. One
assumption was that the laws in the written Torah would be
considered statutes for purposes of the comparison. One important
question was whether these rules were used to construct the
statutes or to construe them after they were written. For example,
an analogy known as a gezerah shavah, depends on the repetition
of certain language in two places in the Five Books of Moses in
order to trigger the application of language in one verse to
another, with one or both references being superfluous in context.
2 Donna Litman, A Case on the Border between Jewish and American
Rules of Statutory Construction: A Comparative Analysis, in THE INTERACTION OF
JEWISH LAW WITH OTHER LEGAL SYSTEMS 120-175 (Christine Hayes & Amos Israel-
Vleeschhouwer eds., 2014).
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Thus, the actual manner in which the language was written or
constructed dictated the meaning of that language, with tradition
teaching which specific provisions were interpreted under this rule
of analogy. For example, the Torah states that Moses "died there"
and Miriam "died there," and further specifies that Moses died "by
the mouth of G-d." The Talmud confirms that Miriam died in the
same manner as Moses and that we learn this through this type of
analogy because both of their deaths were described by the
superfluous phrase that he or she "died there." This result is very
different from how American statutes generally are construed.
Under American law, if two statutes were constructed with the
same language, with only one of them containing additional
language, the omission of that language generally would be
considered intentional. Thus, the additional language would apply
only where expressed and would not apply by implication. This
difference in interpretation reinforced the importance of
understanding the rules that apply to a given legal system before
deciding that a rule from another legal system could help interpret
a provision in the given legal system. In addition, similar rules
used to construe statutes are found in both systems, such as an
inference by kal vahomer (from major to minor, or vice versa) and
an inference a fortiori; although they often are applied differently.
Sometimes, these inferences are designated by the phrase "how
much more so." While Jewish law may employ an inference by kal
vahomer to apply a law from the Torah to a context not addressed
in the Torah, American law may use an a fortiori inference to
apply a judicial rule for one statute to another statute when both
statutes are silent as to that rule. Thus, Jewish law may infer
liability from the express case of a bailee to the case of a borrower;
while American law may infer that a judicial rule addressing the
consequence of failing to meet a deadline in one statute should
apply to failing to meet a deadline in another statute. By exploring
the application of these rules of construction, I have a greater
appreciation of how laws are construed in both systems and the
significance of how they are constructed.
Studying Jewish Law as a professor of American law also
expanded my scholarship to include how Jewish and American
laws on the same subject are applied contemporaneously. There
are a number of areas in which Jewish law and American law
operate in parallel systems with some overlap. One area involves
estate planning for observant individuals, or individuals with
observant beneficiaries, who may execute one set of documents for
secular purposes and another set for religious purposes. Professor
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Steven Resnicoff and I co-authored an article, entitled Jewish and
American Inheritance Law: Commonalities, Clashes, and Estate
Planning Consequences3 to discuss modern planning opportunities
under these parallel laws. It is challenging to write a comparative
law article based on two different systems, particularly when they
developed over different periods of time with different types of
authority. It also is challenging when concepts accepted in one
system are not accepted in the other system. For example, both
Jewish law and American law permit inter vivos gifts, including
revocable gifts, but only American law permits testamentary gifts.
One theory of comparing the systems is to discuss each separately
and then compare them to determine what they have in common
and where they differ. Another theory is to compare both systems
based on the meaning and elements of one of the systems. Which is
more effective depends on the purpose of the comparison and to
whom the comparison will be communicated. Thus, one can look at
Jewish law through the lens of American law to help understand
the meaning of Jewish law and its application to American Jews.
Another area I have focused on in my teaching is whether
the religious aspects of Jewish law can be separated from the
secular aspects for purposes of American law. This is especially
important given the increased interest in Jewish law and its
citation in American case law and secondary sources. For example,
the Decalogue contains a commandment prohibiting murder, with
capital punishment being imposed under very limited
circumstances when small sanhedrins were still in existence. This
commandment is preceded by the verse that "G-d spoke all these
words." American law defines murder as a crime, and in some
jurisdictions, it is subject to capital punishment or imprisonment
for life. This raises the question of whether there is a difference
between G-d commanding that one should not commit murder and
that one who does so shall surely be put to death and society
deciding that murder is wrong and that it should be punished.
This question is relevant even though both Americans and Jews
agreed to be subject to these respective laws. In addition, Jewish
law provides an opportunity for a person who has been convicted of
murder to confess for purposes of obtaining a place in the world to
come. Thus, Jewish law has religious aspects to it that differ from
a secular system that determines what is permitted or prohibited.
3 Donna Litman & Steven Resnicoff, Jewish and American Inheritance
Law: Commonalities, Clashes, and Estate Planning Consequences, in WISDOM AND
UNDERSTANDING - STUDIES IN JEWISH LAW IN HONOUR OF BERNARD S. JACKSON 166-
192 (Leib Moscovitz & Yosef Rivlin eds., 2012).
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In a court of law, citing Jewish law-or in particular, the
Bible-may raise additional issues. One should question the
significance of tracing an American law back to Jewish law or
quoting the Bible to support aspects of American law, such as
capital punishment. Is American law being compared to Jewish
law because it may have been derived from it or because it may
share some common aspects? If so, are the laws still similar and
can Jewish law help provide an answer to a problem under
American law? By contrast, if the purpose of citing Jewish law is
because it is based on a higher authority or because it is supported
by the belief of a judge, member of a jury, or other person citing
the law, that is problematic. American law should not be based on
the religious belief of an individual or group, regardless of whether
one shares that belief. Thus, before one cites the Bible or Jewish
law, one should consider whether the religious aspects can be
separated from the secular aspects or whether the religious
aspects are key to the strength of the authority. Exploring how
other systems solve common problems can create models for
reform and help create solutions. On the other hand,
understanding the significance of the religious aspects and the
beliefs involved is important in determining the validity of the
comparison.
My personal and professional journey has progressed from
knowledge of Judaism as a religion that is recognized under
American law, to understanding Jewish law as a comprehensive
body of law that includes a specific religion. My joint studies have
enhanced my understanding of both Jewish law and American
law, and their interrelationship, and have significantly influenced
my legal scholarship.
